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Abstract 
 
This paper argues for a return to the social thought of the often ignored early 20th Century 
English thinker G.D.H. Cole. Cole combined a sociological critique of capitalism and liberal 
democracy with a well developed alternative in his work on Guild Socialism bearing 
particular relevance to advanced capitalist societies. Both of these, with their focus on the 
limitations on ‘free and unfettered service’ in associations and the inability of capitalism to 
yield emancipation in either production or consumption, are relevant to social theorists 
looking to understand, critique and contribute to the subversion of neoliberalism.  
Therefore, we suggest that Cole’s associational sociology, and the invitation it provides to 
think of formations beyond capitalism and liberal democracy, is a timely and valuable 
resource which should be returned to. 
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Introduction 
In 2010, Routledge published new editions of some of G.D.H. Cole’s works. While a highly 
welcomed decision, little room was made for the distinctively sociological works of Cole, 
such as Social Theory (1920) and Essays in Social Theory (1950). This did not come as a 
surprise, for Cole was, and continues to be known, for his political ideas and activism. A 
close inspection of his works, including the most ostensibly political ones such as Guild 
Socialism Restated (1980), nevertheless reveals an acute interest in sociological theorising. 
His rejection of what he viewed as an ‘isolation of specialized studies from the general study 
of Society as a whole’ (Cole, 1950: 29) in early 20th century British sociology1 meant that he 
consistently sought to articulate sociological concerns with those of a political nature. Thus, 
although a sociological perspective is clearly discernible in his work, it assumes a distinctive 
form, combining both a critical and normative outlook. 
Imbued with the task of stimulating large-scale social change and shaping its 
direction, Cole’s works were underpinned by the typically modernist concern for the 
development of emancipatory practices, particularly discernible during his Guild Socialist 
phase.2 In this article we demonstrate what this has to offer social theory today by exposing 
both the distinctiveness of his perspective and its relevance to contemporary conditions.  
There have been attempts to revive Cole for contemporary discussion, most prominently in 
the work of Hirst on associative democracy (Hirst 1994).  Hirst returned to Cole’s ideas – 
which we will discuss below – of free association and functional representation (despite the 
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criticisms he offers of Cole’s conception of this, Hirst 1994:45) as central to a new social and 
political order.  While Hirst’s work, along with that of other writers we will discuss below, 
has been admirable in its attempt to demonstrate Cole’s relevance to the current day, these 
share two factors which we aim to move away from in this article.  Firstly, in such 
arguments, Cole is presented primarily as a political theorist, with his associational view 
seen as political ‘pluralism’.  Secondly, in doing so, some commentators such as Stears 
(2006) have seen Cole’s pluralism as innately socialist, while others have downplayed the 
connection of Cole’s normative pluralism to his critique of capitalism (See for example Hirst 
1994:19).  Contrary to such accounts, we shall present Cole as a sociologist who spoke about 
the value of a normatively-driven sociological approach and decried those who had adopted 
a Weberian value-free perspective (Cole 1957c).  
We shall begin by drawing the broad contours of what we term his ‘associational 
sociology’.  This will include highlighting the importance of a sociological reading of 
Rousseau on Cole’s thought and how he distances himself from Durkheim.  It will then be 
shown how his sociological stance informed his own critique of capitalism and liberal 
democracy.  Here we note similarities and differences between Cole’s critique and that of 
Marxism, as well as his value as potential critic of neoliberalism. This will be followed by a 
discussion of his sociological alternative, marked by a focus on the potential for associative 
action and its political representation.  We will also discuss some of the key tendencies 
towards social change Cole identified, and their relevance to present-day conditions. 
 
Drawing the contours of Cole’s associational sociology 
Cole was a prominent figure in the short-lived Guild Socialist movement of the early 
twentieth century. The movement located associative life at the centre of its socialist vision, 
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treating it as the principal precondition for emancipatory practices. For Cole, associative 
action is not so much a utopian vision to force onto social life as an essential component of 
any pre-existing social organisation. This is explained by the fact that ‘almost every 
individual in [society] has [...] close contacts with many diverse forms of social institution 
and association’ (Cole, 1920: 4). As trade unionists, members of a sports team or political 
party, at the workplace or in their leisure time, individuals often share a ‘common purpose 
or purposes’ and ‘rules of common action’ which are essential components of associative 
action (Cole, 1920: 37). This led Cole to treat the ‘action of men in association’ as ‘the 
subject matter of social theory’ (Cole, 1920: 17). Associative action itself, then, presupposes 
all forms of social organisation and, correspondingly, acts as an essential medium for the 
development of societal norms and value structures.  
For Cole, then, associative action is a social fact and sociology’s most fundamental 
unit of analysis. But how does he explain individuals’ willingness to enter into association 
with others and adopt cooperative forms of action? Two dimensions can be found in Cole’s 
explanation. The first one focuses on the rational component of associative action, where 
‘[t]he consciousness of a want requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction is the basis of 
association’ (Cole, 1920: 34). The ‘want’ in question can assume a multitude of forms, 
ranging from the production of a material requirement, fulfilling our consumer needs, or the 
pursuit of non-economic interests. These are satisfied through the spheres of production, 
consumption and civic activity (Cole 1920) respectively. The second element is a deeper, 
affective, dimension where individuals engaging in cooperative action are ‘led to do so by a 
strong impulsion of the sentiment of social solidarity’ (Cole, 1950: 128). The existence of a 
multitude of social organisations and the possibility for social order are therefore explained 
by the fact that individuals are cooperative beings by nature. 
5 
 
Despite such a prominent emphasis on associative/cooperative action, his 
sociological perspective is first and foremost one concerned with the problem of human 
emancipation. Along with Laski and Tawney, Cole developed a ‘new brand of individualism’ 
(Stears, 2006: 102), that sought to remedy the apparent problems associated with the 
overly communal nature of freedom found in Figgisian pluralist thought (Stears, 2006). His 
works emphasised individuals’ continuous desire to maximise their ‘personal liberty’ (Cole, 
1920: 184). Understood as a form of pleasurable self-expression achieved by the release of 
the ‘creative, scientific and artistic impulses’ (Cole 1980, 115-6), his approach to 
emancipation echoes Marx’s call for the ‘open revelation of human faculties’ in his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (2000: 102).3 It also exhibits features of the 
reconciliation of sensuous and rational faculties advocated by first generation Frankfurt 
School theorists (Masquelier, 2014).  
He was nevertheless critical of the scientific component of the ‘Marxian method’ 
(Cole, 1948: 14) for its tendency to dissolve the ‘constructive influence of the minds of men’ 
(Cole, 1948: 34) as well as for the corresponding ‘error to attribute to “classes” [...] any 
reality distinct from that of the individuals which compose them’ (Cole, 1948: 11). Insisting 
that ‘men make their history,’ he hoped to formulate a sociological perspective in which 
individuals’ own capacity to both control and alter their conditions of existence is fully 
recognised. To do so, he thought, one had to re-assess the respective place held by the 
general (class structures/consciousness) and the particular (individual agents’) conceptions 
of the good life. The reality of the former had to be re-aligned with that of the latter.  
 In order to better grasp how Cole attempted to solve the riddle of this relationship, 
exemplified by the antagonism between liberals and communitarians (Eisenberg, 1995),4 
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one has to turn to the inspiration he drew from Rousseau, particularly his concept of general 
will.  In doing so, we can see that Cole turned to Rousseau for sociological inspiration rather 
than treating him as a strictly political figure. Indeed, while he admired Rousseau for 
treating the will to cooperate as derivative of an innate impulse towards sociality, Cole also 
praised his views on the effects of associative action on the relationship between individual 
and collective conceptions of the good life. He interpreted such a relationship as follows: 
 
whenever [individuals] form or connect themselves with any form of association for 
any active purpose, [they] develop in relation to the association an attitude which 
looks to the general benefit of the association rather than their own individual 
benefit. This is not to say that they cease to think of their own individual advantage – 
only that there is, in their associative actions, an element, which may be stronger or 
weaker, of seeking the advantage of the whole association, or of all its members, as 
distinct from the element which seeks only personal advantage. (Cole, 1950: 114) 
 
Here associative action resurfaces not merely as the product of a will but also as the 
source of social organisation whose object ‘is not merely material efficiency, but also 
essentially the fullest self-expression of all the members’ (Cole, 1920: 208). The purpose of 
the association itself is therefore construed by Rousseau (and Cole) as an extension of 
individuals’ own interests/will. Consequently, the ‘personal freedom’ (Cole, 1917: 5) 
associations succeed in facilitating becomes both constitutive of and constituted by the 
common good embodied in the general will of each association. The freedom arrived at 
here, therefore, does not consist of an unlimited, unhindered or absolute right to act as one 
pleases, such as Rousseau’s ‘natural freedom’ (Simpson, 2006). Instead, it takes the shape of 
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a form of moral autonomy entailing 'obedience to the law which we prescribe to ourselves’ 
(Rousseau, 1993: 196). Cole nevertheless insists that despite its ‘rational precepts,’ this 
moral freedom ‘finds an echo in the heart of the ‘natural man,”’ with ‘”human feeling” as its 
motivating force’ (Cole, 1993: liii-liv).  Therefore, moral freedom and its realisation in the 
associative will is a building block of sociality. 
Alongside such a concern for the maximisation of personal freedom in associations, 
one finds what Stears characterised as Cole’s ‘obsession with complex and competing social 
allegiances’ (2006: 99). Their very existence, he thought, meant that in order to remain truly 
free, individuals could not owe allegiance to a single authority, but would instead develop 
different categories of ‘loyalties’ and ‘obligations’ (Cole 1926).  These are determined by the 
type of association – producer, consumer or civic – to which individuals belong. Since they 
develop through associative action, however, these loyalties and obligations are not 
obstacles to autonomy. Instead, they are both a desirable and necessary component of 
associative life giving ‘men [sic and throughout this article] the fullest possible scope for 
creative activity’ (Cole, 1950: 97). It is their capacity to accommodate the principle of ‘self-
government’ (Cole, 1917) and, as Warren recently put it, yield a ‘power to make collective 
decisions’ through ‘equal participation in collective judgment’ (2001: 60) that associations 
can, in principle, be expected to pave for the way for agency (see Lamb, 2005).  It is through 
our associational activity that, both historically and in day-to-day actions, agency is 
achieved, alongside the personal/creative development of the individual.5 
Cole identified one last essential feature of the form of associative life organised 
around the principle of ‘self-government.’ Having observed the development of a ‘spirit of 
free communal service’ (Cole, 1980: 44) in the medieval guilds, Cole envisaged a similar 
development in associations. To be able to yield such a ‘spirit,’ he argued, the individual 
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‘must feel that he is enjoying real self-government and freedom at his work; or he will not 
work well and under the impulse of the communal spirit’ (Cole, 1980: 49). This can be 
achieved where associations substitute the ‘motives of greed and fear’ (Cole 1980: 45) with 
the ‘motive of free service’ and ‘breed men capable of being good citizens both in industry 
and in every aspect of social life’ (Cole, 1980: 61). Consequently, associations must free 
themselves from any distortion capable of undermining the fine balance between individual 
conceptions of the good life and the common good.6 
 To summarise, associative action is central to Cole’s sociology, as it constitutes an 
innate impulse towards sociality, it is thought to be beneficial, if not essential, for human 
emancipation and the development of a solidaristic outlook.  In doing so, Cole shares 
similarities with Durkheim not only in associative action’s role in the development of 
solidarism, but also in the means (guilds/corporations) to achieve this.  Indeed, Cole spoke 
positively of Durkheim’s work as an indication of the kind of social science combining 
analysis of the political and economic, which he favoured (Cole 1934: 3).  A full exposition of 
these links is beyond this paper (see Dawson 2013: 62-83). However, there are some 
differences.  Most notably, Cole emphasised what he saw as the ‘conservative’ nature of 
Durkheim’s theory and its lack of materialism. For Cole, it was capitalism which gave society 
its value structures and Durkheim marginalises this in seeing religion as the base of society 
(Cole 1952:127).  This is why Cole formulated his associational sociology alongside a 
stringent critique of the capitalist economic and socio-political institutions based on the very 
sociological premises detailed above. It is to this critique and a demonstration of its 
relevance to contemporary conditions that we shall now turn.  
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From associational sociology to a critique of capitalism and liberal democracy 
Cole’s associational sociology informed the core postulates of his critique of capitalism and 
liberal democracy. As an economic system favouring profit over need; competition over 
cooperation; efficiency and productivity over ‘pleasure in work well done’ (Cole, 1980: 61); 
and ‘greed [...] and fear’ over ‘free and communal service’ (Cole, 1980: 44-5), it failed to give 
scope to ‘man’s natural qualities’ (Cole, 1917: 256). Consequently, 
 
[t]he crowning indictment of capitalism is that it destroys freedom and individuality 
in the worker, that it reduces man to a machine, and that it treats human beings as 
means to production instead of subordinating production to the well-being of the 
producer. (Cole, 1917: 24) 
 
Not only was ‘the primitive social impulse [...] overlaid by bad institutions’ (Cole, 
1950: 129), the latter also destroyed personal freedom while causing the ‘failure of the 
association so affected to fulfil its proper function in Society’ (Cole, 1950: 145). Despite not 
having lived long enough to be able to witness capitalism’s latest evolutions, a close reading 
of his work reveals a contemporary relevance to societies under the rule of neoliberal 
economic and political forces, some of which will be discussed in this section. 
 A first key dimension of his critique relates to the sphere of production. Drawing his 
inspiration from William Morris, Cole wrote extensively on the problems emanating from an 
‘impulse towards self-expression thwarted by commercialism’ (Cole, 1980: 119). Like Morris, 
and unlike Durkheim, Cole was a fervent critic of the division of labour, with a particular 
concern for its tendency to ‘divorce the executant from the designer or planner’ and the 
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resulting loss of the ‘dignity of common labour’ (Cole, 1957a: 9). Like the early Marx, he 
treated production as a central outlet for self-expression and cooperative action.7 
Correspondingly, he equated the increased specialisation of tasks engendered by the 
subordination of workers to a productivist regime of capital accumulation with a loss of 
control fatal to production’s essential role in the release of ‘creative, scientific and artistic 
impulses.’ Cole, here, would have also been at home with critics of Fordist scientific 
management on production, such as Braverman (1974).  
Since the 1970s, however, innovative methods of production have emerged that are 
often said to have marked the emergence of a ‘post-Fordist’ regime of accumulation aimed 
at overcoming the rigidities of its predecessor (Harvey, 1989; Kumar, 1995). Despite post-
Fordism’s relative success in  achieving a degree of ‘elimination of job demarcation’ (Harvey, 
1989: 177), managerial horizontalism (Kasmir, 1996) and a generally ‘enhanced work 
satisfaction for the bulk of workers’ (Kumar, 1995: 47), contemporary commentators have 
highlighted its limited capacity to yield authentic and lasting self-expression. This state of 
affairs, it is argued, derives from production processes subjected to highly flexible, 
globalised and competitive labour markets and privatised resources geared towards the 
‘accommodation of ceaseless change’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 17). Often, then, the central 
resultant of the rule of these neoliberal economic forces is described as an intolerable 
economic insecurity causing the erosion of loyalties and obligations; or, as Sennett (1998) 
put it, ‘the corrosion of character’. 
The objective character of such insecurity has been disputed by Doogan whose 
empirical analysis revealed that ‘job stability has not declined and that long-term 
employment has increased in many sectors of the advanced economies’ (Doogan, 2009: 4). 
It follows that in order to find an explanation for the sense of insecurity dominating 
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neoliberal societies, one has to move away from the widespread view that the material 
impact of neoliberalism encourages insecurity, towards a diagnosis more inclined to accept 
the notion of distortion of the associative will proposed by Cole. Doogan offers a convincing 
Bourdieusian reconceptualisation of insecurity by treating it as an ideological tool employed 
for ‘both political ends and political advantage’ (Doogan, 2009: 10). But, Cole’s work makes 
its own contribution to the diagnosis by concentrating on the effects of ‘bad institutions’ – 
most notably capitalist markets and corporations – on individuals and, more specifically, 
their capacity to achieve associative self-expression. For, with Cole’s critique of capitalist 
institutions, the neoliberal ‘rhetoric’ of self-reliance and self-responsibility deconstructed 
(and condemned) by Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001: 4), comes to be treated as a barrier to 
both the rational and sentimental motive of associative action. Under its spell, individuals 
cope with the sense of insecurity through an intensified competitive pursuit of self-interest 
or ‘rugged individualism’ preventing any inclination towards the communal spirit 
experienced as a desirable or natural end. The resulting disconnection between individual 
interests and the common good means any form of freedom granted by neoliberal market 
forces becomes meaningless. This is explained by the fact that it divorces the longing for 
secure self-expression or control, from the form of associative action that could give them 
the ‘confidence without which freedom can hardly be exercised’ (Bauman, 2005, 36). 
Therefore, adapting elements of Cole’s critique of capitalism to a critique of marketization 
processes unfolding under the rule of neoliberalism, makes it possible to gain a fresh insight 
into the ‘normative fragmentation of [neoliberal] societies’ (Crouch, 2011: 180). 
Moreover, Cole’s critique did not, as did most Marxian critiques of his time, limit 
itself to problems associated with production. Conscious of the fact that the individual 
worker did ‘not find his job interesting or pleasurable and seeks his pleasure outside it, in his 
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hours of leisure’ (Cole, 1957b: 16), he expressed an early interest in exploring matters 
regarding consumption. Cole quickly came to realise that consumption was subjected to 
very similar repressive forces to those found in production. Like producers, he argued, 
consumers lacked the capacity to exert sufficient control over the decisions taken within 
their own sphere of activity. By ‘dictat[ing] the consumer what he shall consume’ and 
‘exploit[ing] the community as the individual profiteer exploits it to-day’ (Cole, 1917: 108), 
commercial agencies deny individuals the ‘freedom for the creative impulse’ as well as for 
‘the impulse of free and unfettered service’ (Cole, 1917: 302). While neoliberal regimes have 
made markets more responsive to consumer demands, thereby recognising that ‘wants are 
of the most diverse character’ (Cole, 1920: 33), this development has also been 
accompanied by a further atomisation of society. Any potential for collective ‘control of 
consumption’ (Cole 1917: 281) is lessened under such a regime. Once again, then, Cole’s 
own condemnation of the distortion of a potential sphere of self-expression and associative 
action by divisive economic forces appears to bear striking relevance to present conditions. 
In fact, like Bauman, Cole viewed the solitary search for pleasure in consumption as an 
insufficient condition for an effective and sustained gratification – or what Bauman (2000) 
would call ‘de facto individualisation’ – dependent on forms of collective control heavily 
distorted by untrammelled market forces.8 Therefore, while Cole shared the emphasis on 
consumption as a realm of identity found in contemporary sociology, he combined this with 
a materialist critique of its atomised form. 
Cole also took the care of explaining what he thought were the causal origins of such 
distortive tendencies:  
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In our own Society at least, and in the larger industrialised communities generally, 
economic divisions are at the present time the principal obstacles to the fulfilment of 
social functions. (Cole, 1920:  151) 
 
Therefore, in common with Marxian ideas of the conflict between labour and capital, 
Cole wished to emphasise the highly distorting effects of such a conflict on the experience 
of associative action. Under a clearly identifiable relationship between ownership and 
control, such as the one found under the early capitalist stage, the conflict of interest 
between the capitalist owner and wage labourer visibly lies at the root of the some of the 
major obstacles to cooperation and self-expression. Once wage labourers come to include 
‘technical specialists, managers, financial experts, buyers and agents whose status and 
remuneration were a long way above those of the manual workers and of workshop 
foremen and supervisors’ (Cole, 1938: 102), one witnesses a ‘blurring of class-divisions’ 
(Cole, 1938: 128) posing new challenges for collective action. While, as Cole observed, such 
a state of affairs, partly driven by the spread of ‘financial capitalism’ (Cole, 1938), did not 
prevent the ‘growing concentration of control of capital’ (Cole, 1938: 126) it did divide the 
working-class movement (Cole, 1948: 155). The historical significance of a new and ‘greatly 
differentiated’ proletariat comprising many ‘grades of labour and levels of incomes and 
education’ (Cole, 1948: 171), such as the one found in the neoliberal age, was therefore 
anticipated by Cole in the immediate post-war era. 
Thus far we have highlighted the following critiques from Cole: the lack of self-
expression in work; the distorting of ‘free and unfettered service’ in associations; lack of 
control in consumption, the origins of economic distortion and the fragmented nature of 
class inequality.  However, additional effects of these inequalities can also be identified 
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beyond the economic sphere, making Cole’s critique also one of the political. Cole viewed 
the modern state as ‘an organ of class domination’ both ‘perverted by the power of the 
capitalists’ and ‘based on coercion’ (Cole, 1980: 122). Here he argued that the liberal 
democratic conception of the state as a ‘self-subsistent and individual realit[y] similar to, or 
greater than, the persons who are members of [it]’ (1920: 22), not only acts as a barrier to 
the political representation of the plurality of interests making up social life, but also 
embodies a ‘conception of human society in terms of Force and Law’ (Cole, 1920: 6). 
Consequently, liberal democracy is said to rely on a conception of the common good which 
it has to manufacture in the face of ‘contending sections’ (Cole, 1920: 150) found in a highly 
hostile capitalist economy. As the effective product of competing interests, then, the 
capitalist state ultimately fails to recognise ‘the motives which hold men together in 
association’ (Cole, 1920: 6); it fails to recognise the associative wills.  
Cole was therefore conscious of, and indeed highly concerned by, the tendency of 
socio-economic inequalities to undermine the democratic character of political decision-
making. His critique of liberal democratic institutions is therefore first and foremost a 
critique of capitalism. The ‘predominance of economic factors’ (Cole, 1980: 180) found in 
societies whose (economic and political) institutions are oriented towards capital 
accumulation, effectively distorts decision-making processes.   The result of this is the 
reproduction, at the political level, of the conflictual relations found in the economy, coming 
to undermine the forms of collective control necessary for truly democratic action. Cole, 
then, ‘treated the influence of economic factors upon non-economic forms of association as 
a form of perversion’ (Cole, 1920: 145). However, since Cole wrote most of his works during 
the liberal stage of capitalist development comprising a state seeking to minimise its role in 
economic affairs, he did not live long enough to witness the emergence of the neoliberal 
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state. This ‘distinctive form of [the neoliberal] state’ (Jessop, 2002: 95) is, contrary to its 
liberal counterpart, clearly ‘proactive in promoting the competitiveness’ of its economic 
space ‘in the face of intensified international [...] competition’ (Jessop, 2002: 124). Today 
one finds political forces playing a central role in eliminating barriers to the free 
accumulation of capital, e.g. labour rights, and promoting  ‘economic and extra-economic 
conditions’ (Jessop, 2002: 95) leading to ‘huge transfer of public funds to private power’ 
(Chomsky, 1999: 67-8). If one adapts Cole’s logic of reasoning to the present situation, one 
no longer merely finds the state, as social organisation, falling victim to economic 
‘perversion,’ but rather sees this institution as one of its key culprits, reflecting 
contemporary arguments concerning the statist nature of the supposedly anti-statist 
neoliberal project (Harvey 2005). In fact, in Cole’s work, one finds a range of sociological 
considerations with which to better appreciate the full scope of the perverse effects of 
neoliberal forces on society, by complementing the Marxian critique of the state’s role in 
promoting the interests of capital with a critique of its role in distorting associative life.  
Furthermore, Cole consistently deplored the fact that the political system had 
developed into a ‘single omnicompetent representative assembly’ (Cole, 1920: 108) 
attempting to manage a ‘vast society which changed its basic structure so fast that the 
magnitude and growing complication of its problems outran hopelessly their capacity to 
learn the difficult art of collective control’ (Cole, 1950: 91). The key issue at hand here is the 
incapacity of the state to promote ‘active [...] citizenship’ (Cole, 1920: 113). On the one 
hand, Cole takes issue with the form of representation entailed by liberal democratic 
decision-making processes, which continue to predominate in contemporary Western 
political systems. Their inadequacies, he argues, is explained by the fact that ‘as soon as the 
voters have exercised their votes, their existence as a group lapses until the time when a 
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new election is required’ (Cole, 1920: 110). Since ‘no man’s will can be treated as a 
substitute for, or representative of, the wills of others’ (Cole, 1920: 103), liberal democracy 
is based on a ‘false theory of representation’ (Cole, 1920: 103). In short, it excludes the 
forms of associative action necessary for truly active political participation.  
Although Cole lived long enough to witness the gradual expansion of the state’s 
administrative apparatus following the political and economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s, 
he had already expressed concerns regarding the effects of bureaucratisation on personal 
freedom prior to this period. For Cole, the key problem with such a ‘machinery’ was not its 
size but its very nature (Cole, 1918: 36). In addition to the problems of representation 
mentioned above, bureaucracy manages all affairs from the ‘point of view of “efficiency”’ 
and at the expense of ‘full and complete’ freedom (Cole, 1918: 25). By subsuming 
individuals’ variegated interests under the universal yardstick of economic efficiency, it is 
thought to bear restrictive effects on individuals’ actions. Bureaucracy, then, is yet another 
political institution restricting the freedom of individuals and an additional instance of the 
perversion of the political sphere by economic interests under capitalism. Initially, then, it 
seems that Cole would have welcomed the neoliberal critique of the bureaucratic state. 
However, upon closer examination, what Cole’s critique of political institutions under 
capitalism – including his critique of bureaucracy – seems to offer is a basis upon which to 
grasp such measures as yet another, and indeed more total, instance of economic 
perversion. Adopting Cole’s own reasoning, then, individuals could be said to end up more 
directly and completely exposed to volatile economic forces ultimately responsible for 
increased economic insecurity, sharper socio-economic inequalities and de-solidarisation 
under the neoliberal regime. Consequently, had Cole lived long enough, he would have 
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surely condemned the role played by an increased exposure to market forces and their 
evidently pernicious effects on the ‘motives which hold men together in association.’ 
In his critique of liberal capitalism, then, Cole grappled with the obstacles to human 
emancipation by condemning the perverse and distorting effects of ‘bad institutions’ on 
self-expression and associative action. Under the guise of neoliberal capitalism, one finds a 
historically specific configuration of economic and political forces further undermining the 
capacity for collective control and authentic self-expression. Flexible labour and consumer 
markets, sharp socio-economic inequalities and the ‘competitive Schumpeterian state’ 
(Jessop, 2002) all affect social relations in a particular way. More specifically, they lead to a 
divorce of the pursuit of self-expression from the ‘primitive social impulse,’ further subject 
individuals to the divisive rule of market forces and impose additional barriers to political 
representation of social plurality.  Here we see his critique was not simply a realisation of a 
pluralist political position, as suggested by others (Hirst 1994), but rather one founded on a 
Rousseau-ian sociological base.  
Despite such obstacles to human emancipation, however, the present situation 
offers new opportunities for radical social change. The next section shall therefore aim to 
expose them, while highlighting the relevance of his libertarian socialist alternative to 
neoliberalism.  
 
Bringing associative action to life 
In the first chapter of Guild Socialism Restated, Cole described the task of the guild socialist, 
i.e. his own task, as follows:  
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He [the guild socialist] claims, not to be imagining a Utopia in the clouds, but to be 
giving form and direction to certain quite definite tendencies which are now at work 
in Society, and to be anticipating the most natural developments of already existing 
institutions and social forces. (Cole, 1980: 11)  
  
 Some of these ‘definite tendencies’ were highlighted above and demonstrate the 
grounded, sociological, nature of his critique and alternative. There, it was shown that Cole 
treats associative action as a necessary – and therefore pre-existing – condition for all forms 
of social organisation including present ones, and places it at the core of his sociological 
approach. Under the spell of capitalist economic interests, associative action does not 
vanish, it merely becomes subsumed under the ethos of competitive individualism, 
economic efficiency and a coercive political machine. Cole’s task consequently consists in 
creating conditions under which the associative spirit or will can thrive and become the 
central force mediating social relations, i.e. to substitute ‘bad’ institutions with ‘good’ ones.  
Cole’s remedy to the ills of capitalism assumes the form of a libertarian socialist 
alternative which aims to re-organise society in such a way as to ‘afford the greatest 
possible opportunity for individual and collective self-expression to all its members’ (Cole, 
1980: 13). Voluntary, open, inclusive and democratic associations are here the chosen form 
of social organisation, for in them individuals are thought to be in the best position to 
‘agree[...] together upon certain methods of procedure, and lay[...] down, in however 
rudimentary a form, rules for common action’ (Cole, 1920: 37). The democratic and 
generally cooperative character of practices flourishing within such associations are treated 
by Cole as ideal conditions for the development of a ‘communal spirit’ (Cole, 1980: 46) and 
the elimination of the various ‘hindrances’ to self-expression such as inequality, 
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bureaucratic managerialism and the division of labour. Thus, in virtue of their capacity to 
give full scope to horizontal decision-making processes, democratic associations play a 
central part in Cole’s attempt to ‘offer the means to resolve the familiar tensions between 
political power and individual development’ (Eisenberg, 1995: 5).9  This, in fact, partly 
explains its appeal to political theorists as a third way when shorn of its anti-capitalist 
elements. 
Various additional conditions for emancipation were laid down by Cole. Firstly, he 
believed that the realisation of such conditions was predicated upon ‘self-government on 
the smallest natural units of control’ (Cole, 1980: 101). The close interpersonal proximity 
these ‘small units’ tend to confer would facilitate the development of values of 
‘cheerfulness, comradeliness, co-operativeness, consideration, kindness’ (Cole, 1950: 7). By 
‘natural’ Cole meant ‘[m]en’s easiest ways of grouping’ and, as such, refer to units such as 
‘the places they live in and the places they work in’ (Cole, 1950: 107). Both the size and 
locality of associations are therefore treated as important factors by Cole, for these 
conditions are instrumental in shaping the spirit of fellowship and facilitating the 
representation of the plurality of interests making up social life.  In a complex and 
differentiated neoliberal world, whereby ‘differences pile up one upon the other’ (Bauman, 
1997: 13), Cole’s associations would not only provide means for the institutional recognition 
of plurality, but would also serve to alleviate the ‘overwhelming sensation of insecurity’ 
(Bauman, 1997: 204) accompanying it. For Cole, this re-organisation of social life could only 
be achieved through a re-organisation of economic life. 
To the ‘industrial autocracy of capitalism’ (Cole, 1980: 51), Cole opposed ‘a free 
[economic] system [that] will bring to the front man’s natural qualities – his sense of 
fellowship, his desire to express himself’ (Cole, 1917: 256). Such a ‘free system,’ would alter 
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the experience of producers in such a way as to ‘make the enterprise he works in a success, 
not in terms of profit, but in terms of rendering a good service to the consuming public, and 
thus contributing towards the improvement of the general standard of living’ (Cole, 1957b: 
36). Democratic associations of producers, the modern guilds, would not only secure the 
collective forms of control required for authentic self-expression, but would also substitute 
the ‘motives of greed [...] and fear’ with ‘the spirit of free and communal service.’ Such a 
spirit is, today, partly exemplified by the production of Free and Open Source Software 
(FOSS) programmes providing a free service while relying on a form of ‘voluntaristic 
cooperation that does not depend on exclusive proprietary control or common relations as 
among the co-operators’ (Benkler 2013:214), such as Mozilla Firefox or Wikipedia.  
Now in a position to make collective decisions regarding the pace of the labour 
process and the nature of the tasks involved in making the products, members of 
democratically organised associations can begin to expect working conditions giving them 
ample scope for creative and, following Cole’s reasoning, pleasurable practices.  The 
emergence of joint-stock companies as a ‘sign of the growing ‘democratisation’ of the 
capitalist system’ (Cole, 1948: 123) could initially be said to have marked a further 
democratisation of the economy. Nevertheless, the limited power accorded to voters and 
the growing concentration of capital found in such a system (Piketty, 2014) means such 
bodies are associative ‘only in form’ (Cole, 1948: 103), thereby demonstrating the limit of 
capitalism’s capacity to align individuals’ interests with the common good.  This indicates 
the need for structural change in both production and market conditions, which Cole 
recognised and proposed to undertake through a re-organisation of the relationship 
between production and consumption: 
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A man is usually either a miner or a railway-man, and not both; but he consumes 
coal, uses the railways, and only limits the variety of his consumption by his lack of 
opportunity. But in both the essential social differentiation is not that between 
individuals but that between interests or concerns, that is, between types of 
production and consumption. (Cole, 1980: 81) 
 
Implicit in this passage is Cole’s rejection of some elements of liberal thinking. What 
he partly wishes to convey here is the fact that the pursuit of freedom through self-
expression does not lead to a separation or differentiation between individuals. A key failure 
of (neo)liberalism is to overlook the fact that the very process involved in such a pursuit 
entails, and is indeed most successfully accomplished through, the collaboration with other 
individuals sharing similar interests. In societies subjected to the logic of the capitalist 
market, the competitive pursuit of freedom by the producer often confronts that of the 
consumer as an obstacle to the latter. Here one not only finds a differentiation/separation 
between the producer and consumer but, more crucially, an antagonism between these 
parties, which assumes a particularly acute form in societies more completely exposed to 
the vicissitudes of market forces. Cole’s proposal to rethink the relationship between them 
is, given the aforementioned contemporary focus on consumerism as a realm of self-
actualisation, timely. He did so by pointing out a crucial feature of the process of satisfaction 
of needs, namely the fact that, by definition, the interests of producers and consumers are 
necessarily in a state of mutual dependence. Without the production of a good, the 
consumer is unable to use it. Without the consumption of a good, the raison d’être of a 
product and a producer’s work vanishes. For this reason, he concluded that  
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the whole body of consumers and the whole body of producers are practically the 
same people, only ranged in the two cases in different formations. There can be no 
real divergence of interests between them. (Cole, 1980: 38-9) 
 
 By rethinking the relationship between producer and consumer, Cole offers a 
platform upon which to re-evaluate the place held by associative action in the process of 
satisfaction of needs. One finds that the conditions for collective control are not confined to 
actions between different producers or consumers, but are equally attainable (and indeed 
desirable) in relations between these two spheres. It is from this stance that Cole came to 
design his own alternative to the capitalist market, which we shall call here the ‘dialogical 
coordination of needs satisfaction’. 
 As we have seen, for Cole, actually existing emancipation rests on individuals’ 
capacity to achieve collective control.  Therefore, he construed his task as one primarily 
oriented towards the elimination of all hindrances to such control both within and between 
the spheres of production and consumption. Within the productive sphere a key indicator of 
such a change could be found in cooperatives, whereby the implementation of ‘one 
member, one vote’ (Cole 1948: 127) provided a basis for collective control. Their potential 
role in serving  large-scale social change has in fact recently been emphasised by several 
contemporary commentators (Alperovitz, 2011; Wyatt, 2011; Wolff, 2012; Shantz and 
Macdonald, 2013), thereby making them more likely agents of change than those Cole 
(1980) had in mind, namely the trade unions. Cole was nevertheless conscious of the need 
for cooperatives currently to submit to the demands of the capitalist market.  Their 
potential for emancipation was necessitated on the need for public ownership and a non-
capitalist market based upon the dialogical coordination of needs satisfaction. In an 
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associative body such as the cooperative, the spirit of free and unfettered service would be 
secured by giving workers the means to control the labour process, and consumers the 
means to define their needs collectively. However, the prospects for the generalised release 
of this spirit rest on producers and consumers fully ‘negotiat[ing] on equal terms’ (Cole, 
1917: 86).  Another level of cooperation, this time between producers and consumers, is 
therefore required.  
Here dialogical coordination comes to play a key role in virtue of making ‘the fullest 
provision for joint consultation and action between the Guilds and the consumers’ 
organisations at every stage, local, regional and national’ (Cole, 1980: 90-1). With it, the 
‘invisible hand’ of the capitalist market dictating the allocation of resources and limiting the 
effective control of producers and consumers alike vanishes, to pave the way for a 
consistent dialogue between representatives of associations in each of the two dimensions 
(supply/production and demand/consumption) of the process of satisfaction of needs. 
While the flexibility of post-Fordism equipped production with a stronger capacity to meet 
the plurality of wants and introduced ‘cooperation’ as a ‘key managerial strategy and a 
dominant corporate ideology of flexible accumulation’ (Kasmir, 1996: 30), it did so at the 
expense of economic security and consumer association as opposed to atomisation. What 
Cole’s dialogical coordination offers is a third way which aims to achieve a combination of 
autonomy and security. As such, he provides means for the institutionalisation of the 
‘collective protection’ of freedom, which Bauman himself has repeatedly urged to realise in 
societies subjected to the fragmentary rule of privatisation and flexibilisation (1997: 205). 
The freedom to choose and release of the various ‘creative, scientific and artistic impulses’ 
through production and consumption would here, Cole believed, be given the means to 
become a meaningful and collective endeavour. It would oppose the rather ‘corrosive’ 
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(Sennett, 1998) effects of flexible labour markets and individualistic search of pleasure 
characterising contemporary capitalist societies, which implicitly rely on collective notions of 
‘good’ consumption found in reference groups (Bauman, 1997) with fully emancipatory 
practices. In order to meet its objectives, however, the aforementioned second level of 
cooperation must develop a system of representation capable of giving the fullest scope to 
both consumers’ and producers’ wills/interests in dialogue. 
 It is here that Cole makes a second distinctive contribution, but this time as the 
alternative to (neo)liberal democratic (‘false’) representation. His critique of liberal 
democracy led him to rethink the relationship between the economy and politics in such a 
way as to overcome the perversion of the latter by the former alongside its lack of 
functional representation. This, he argued, can only be achieved once the distance between 
the representative and the represented is minimised, and channels of communication 
between the local, regional and national levels are fully developed. This is done in two ways. 
Firstly, Cole insisted on the availability of a ‘right of recall’ by the represented party on the 
representative (Cole, 1980: 134). Secondly, the ‘true’ representation of the general will of a 
local association – itself an extension of an individual’s will – can only be expected under 
conditions whereby the purpose of the association, i.e. its function, is itself being 
represented. Only then could political representation give recognition to the social value of 
an association’s function and become a real source of social empowerment, for the 
’functional organisation of Society contains in itself the guarantee of the recognition of the 
fact that society is based upon the individuals’  (Cole, 1920: 192). Representing the function 
of an organisation at the political level therefore entails a direct representation of an 
individual’s will. As ‘the underlying principle of social organisation’ (Cole, 1920: 48), then, 
function ought to become the underlying principle of political representation if the latter is 
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to be expected to give scope to personal freedom. The state as we know it would here 
vanish to pave the way for producer guilds and consumer councils functionally represented 
and coordinated by a ‘commune’ at the local, regional and national levels (Cole, 1980: 124).   
 Given the increasingly complex and globalised nature of the contemporary world, 
however, one is justified in asking how Cole sought to address the problem of international 
relations. Such a theme was picked up by Holthaus, who convincingly demonstrated how 
Cole’s own ‘functionalism,’ particularly the one found in his work following the Guild 
Socialist phase, could make it possible to envisage ‘democratic empowerment and 
transnational co-operation’ (2014: 15). Here, Cole’s functionalism is said to have combined 
‘some economic democracy and consent about long-term economic aims’ (Holthaus, 2014: 
12) in an institutional vision oriented towards the international coordination of the process 
of satisfaction of needs.10  
The global significance of Cole’s thought can also be found in some contemporary 
global formations, most notably the alter-globalization – at least in its ‘way of subjectivity’ 
form (Pleyers 2011) – and Occupy Wall Street movements.  These developed ways of 
organising which, in their use of groupings such as ‘general assemblies’ and ‘working groups’ 
in order to achieve ‘horizontal’ organisation around ‘consensus’ (Flank, 2011: 8), reflected 
the ‘functional bodies’ organised in a commune as advocated by Cole (cf. Cole, 1980: 124).  
The sociological value of Cole’s perspective lies in the link it draws between the pluralisation 
of everyday life, that we engage in multiple forms of production, consumption and civic 
activity, and the multiple points of entry, including the functionally specific points, which he 
advocates for the political sphere.  The diversification of movements, found in the way of 
subjectivity, reflects these conditions and the shift to what Boltanski terms the ‘artistic 
critique’ which ‘becomes exasperated with all which standardises, uniformises and 
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massifies’ (Boltanski 2002:6).  Like Cole, then, members of contemporary social movements 
seek to accommodate the pluralist reality of complex and differentiated societies in highly 
consensual decision-making processes aimed at unleashing the free communal spirit 
through seemingly functional forms of representation11.     
 
 
Conclusion 
Keen to circumvent the aporias of mere negation and unwilling to find comfort in the belief 
in capitalism’s self-destruction, Cole unreservedly and unashamedly construed his task as 
sociologist in distinctively prescriptive terms. His work not only reveals a high degree of 
optimism regarding individuals’ capacity to become ‘socially good,’ but also proposes 
possible avenues for the attainment of such a goal. To the perversion of an innate impulse 
towards sociality by capitalist and liberal democratic institutions, he opposed a form of 
social empowerment thought to facilitate the undistorted release of such an impulse.  
Like the Burawoyan (2005) public sociologist, Cole would want us to take a moral 
stance; to publicly condemn what one views as intolerable conditions of existence; to 
engage with and serve the public so as to maximise the progressive impact of sociological 
research. But Cole’s ambition for sociology (and social sciences as a whole) also reached 
beyond the confines of contemporary public sociology. He did not merely seek to induce 
social change by stimulating indignation, but complemented the latter by an ambitious 
programme of action which could today serve as an invaluable source for the task of 
counteracting divisive neoliberal forces and reinvigorating associative life like a phoenix 
rising from the ashes of economic perversion.  
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1
 See Dawson and Masquelier (2015) for more detail on Cole’s relation to sociology in Britain 
2
 Such a phase, characterised by a ‘politics of democratic persuasion and individual freedom’ (Stears, 2006: 
274) is often distinguished from later concerns regarding socialist strategy and tactics and the acceptance of a 
positive role for the state and planning in international affairs, in response to the political and economic crises 
of the 1920s and 1930s (Holthaus, 2014), for Wright (1979) Cole moves from guild socialism to ‘liberal 
socialism’ in an attempt to defend the British order against fascism.  Although he is said to have eventually 
returned to his initial libertarian concerns (Stears, 2006), Cole never really abandoned the view that ‘Socialists 
[...] do not regard the increase in State control over economic affairs [...] as marking any advance towards a 
Socialist system’ (Cole, 1938: 204) and in his final book argued ‘I feel sure that a Socialist society…must rest on 
the widest possible diffusion of power and responsibility, so as to enlist the active participation for as many as 
possible of its citizens in the tasks of democratic self-government’ (Cole 1960: 337).  Therefore, while 
throughout the rest of the article we will refer to Cole’s guild socialist ‘phase’, by this we mean the period 
(mainly from 1917-1925) in which Cole was an active member of the guild socialist movement and used its 
terms, without also saying that this was a normatively distinct phase of Cole’s oeuvre.  
3
 Cole’s work, however, shows no evidence that he had read this particular text, which may have been 
translated in English too late for Cole to get a chance to engage with it. 
4
 Communitarianism should here be understood as a political-philosophical stance giving a central place to the 
values of a group, often at the expense of individual conceptions of the good life. 
5 Although Eisenberg highlighted Cole’s incapacity to achieve such a goal by failing to ‘understand the need for 
diversity’ and personal development (1995: 74), it seems that Cole was more conscious of such issues than she 
allows him to be. For example, in Essays in Social Theory, Cole emphasises the need to recognise the 
‘continuous adaptation to changing needs and growing knowledge’ (Cole, 1950: 74). Such an oversight could 
be explained by the fact that Eisenberg drew her claims from only one of Cole’s work, namely Social Theory 
(1920)   
6 Like Habermas, Cole sought to protect interpersonal relations against the distorting effects of money and 
power. However, Rousseau’s influence on Cole’s wish to turn ‘sentiment’ into ‘a force in the shaping of human 
affairs’ (Cole 1950, 128), led him propose a different relationship between ‘reason ordering and will acting’ 
from the one found in Habermas’s work (Habermas 1989, 82). Indeed, while the latter effectively dissolved 
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‘will acting’ in ‘reason ordering’ within his theory of communicative action (See Masquelier 2014), Cole 
attributed a central role to actions driven by the ‘will’ of individuals. 
7
 As Stears (2006) and Holthaus (2014) noted, Cole did nevertheless express doubts regarding the treatment of 
production as a potential sphere of pleasurable self-expression following the demise of the Guild Socialist  
movement and the economic crisis.  
8
 For a more detailed discussion of the affinity between Cole and Bauman, see Dawson (2013). 
9
 Although Eisenberg makes this claim with regards to the potential of political pluralism in general – not Cole’s 
own – it was shown above that Cole does succeed in combining both elements.   
10
 Holthaus (2014) did nevertheless reveal that Cole’s international thought fell short of developing a vision 
capable of fully excluding the state from the management of international affairs.  
11
 For a more detailed analysis of the similarities between Cole’s own alternative and contemporary social 
movements see Dawson (2013) and Masquelier (2014) 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Alperovitz, G. (2011) America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming our wealth, our liberty and our 
democracy, 2nd edition, Boston, MA: Democracy Collaborative Press 
 
Alperovitz, G. (2013) ‘The emerging paradoxical possibility of a democratic economy,’ in 
Shantz, J. and Macdonald, J. B. (eds) Beyond Capitalism: Building democratic alternatives for 
today and the future, New York: Bloomsbury 
 
Bauman, Z. (1997) Postmodernity and its Discontents, Cambridge: Polity 
 
 
Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Benkler, Y. (2013) ‘Practical anarchism: Peer mutualism, market power, and the fallible 
state,’ Politics and Society, June, Vol 41(2): 212-251 
 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Boltanski, L. (2002) ‘The Left after May 1968 and the Longing for Total Revolution’, Thesis 
Eleven, 69: 1-20. 
 
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (2001) ‘NewLiberalSpeak: Notes on the Planetray Vulgate,’ 
Radical Philosophy, Vol. 105 
 
Braverman, H. (1974) Labor and Monoploy Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century, New York: Monthly Review Press 
 
Burawoy, M. (2005) ‘For public sociology,’ American Sociological Review, February, Vol. 70: 
4-2/8 
 
Cole, G.D.H.  (1917) Self-government in Industry, London: George Bell & Sons 
 
Cole, G.D.H. and Mellor, W. (1918) The Meaning of Industrial Freedom, The Herald: London  
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1920) Social Theory, London: Methuen & Co. 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1926) ‘Loyalties’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 26 (1925-1926), 151-
70. 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1934) Some Relations between Political and Economic Theory. London: 
Macmillan & Co. 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1938) Socialism in Evolution, London: Pelican Books  
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1944) A Century of Cooperation, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1948) The Meaning of Marxism, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1950) Essays in Social Theory, London: Macmillan 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1952) Politico-Economic Theories Part II (1850-). Lecture, Cole Collection, 
Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Box 55, Document E3/13/1/1-172. 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1957a) “William Morris as a Socialist,” London: William Morris Society 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1957b) The Case for Industrial Partnership, London: MacMillan & Co LTD 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1957c) ‘Sociology and Social Policy’, British Journal of Sociology 8(2): 158-71. 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1960) A History of Socialist Thought: Volume V, Socialism and Fascism 1931-
1939. London: Macmillan 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1980) Guild Socialism Restated, London: Transaction Books 
 
Cole, G.D.H. (1993) ‘Introduction,’ in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and 
Discourses, London: Everyman 
 
Chomsky, N. (1999) Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global World Order, London: 
Seven Stories Press  
 
Chomsky, N. (2012) Occupy, London: Penguin.  
 
Crouch, C. (2011) The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Dawson, M. (2013) Late Modernity, Individualization and Socialism: An Associational 
Critique of Neoliberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Dawson, M. and Masquelier, C. (2015) ‘G.D.H. Cole: Sociology, Politics, Empowerment and 
‘How to be Socially Good’’ in Alex Law and Eric Royal Lybeck (eds) Sociological Amnesia: 
Cross-Current in Disciplinary History, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 125-40 
 
Doogan, K. (2009) New Capitalism ? The Transformation of Work, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Flank, L. (2011) Voices from the 99 Percent: An Oral History of the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement, St Petersbug, Florida: Red and Black Publishers 
 
Fuchs, C. (2011) ‘Cognitive capitalism or informational capitalism? The role of class in the 
information economy,’ in Michael Peters and Ergin Bulut (eds) Cognitive capitalism, 
Education and Digital Labor, New York: Peter Lang 
 
Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity : An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
 
Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hirst, P. (1994) Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
 
Holthaus, L. (2014) G.D.H. ‘Cole’s International Thought : the Dilemmas of Justifying 
Socialism in the Twentieth Century,’ The International History Review, April, online first  
 
Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Kasmir, S. (1996) The Myth Of Mondragon: Cooperatives, Politics, and Working-Class Life in 
a Basque Country, Albany: SUNY Press 
 
Kumar, K. (1995) From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lamb, P. (2005) ‘G.D.H. Cole on the General Will: A Socialist Reflects on Rousseau’, European 
Journal of Political Theory, 4:3, 283-300. 
 
Marx, K. (2000) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in McLellan, D. Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Masquelier, C. (2014) Critical Theory and Libertarian Socialism: Realizing the Political 
Potential of Critical Social Theory, New York: Bloomsbury  
 
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Piore, M.J. and Sabel, C.F. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, 
New York: Basic Books 
 
Rousseau, J.J. (1993) The Social Contract and Discourses, London: Everyman 
 
Shantz, J. and Macdonald, J. B. (eds) (2013) Beyond Capitalism: Building democratic 
alternatives for today and the future, New York: Bloomsbury 
Simpson, M. (2006) Rousseau's Theory of Freedom, New York: Continuum 
Stears, M. (2006) Progressives, Pluralists and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of the 
state in the United States and Britain 1909-1926, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Warren, M.E. (2001) Association and Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Wolff, R. (2012) Democracy at Work: A cure for capitalism, Chicago: Haymarket Books 
 
Wright, A. (1979) G.D.H. Cole and Socialist Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wyatt, C. (2011) The Defetishised Society: New Economic Democracy as libertarian 
alternative to capitalism, New York: Bloomsbury 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
